by Pasquale Dattola
To regain geopolitical relevance, the European Union must advance reforms to its institutional architecture to foster efficiency and dynamism in rapidly changing times. By doing so, the article argues for a joint reform of the relationship between the European Commission and the European External Action Service, with the two merging. Alongside the establishment of a new political institution capable of providing effective political direction, the EU can bypass the unanimity trap and finally align its political settings with the pace of modern global crises.
The Illusion of the Economic Giant
Throughout its existence, the European Union has been described as an economic giant rather than a purely geopolitical (or even inherently political) player. In recent history, the willingness to move away from this definition has become increasingly clear. The Commission’s attempts to make bold moves towards a new EU security strategy for 2026 speak for themselves, as a clear recognition of the changing times and the need to act. Moreover, the changing US strategic interests, with increasing focus on the control of the Indo-Pacific, make coordination and reforms more urgent, as also highlighted by the Commission for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius. Even with evident intentions, the Union constantly finds its geopolitical role undermined. As seen in its impact on the two wars currently underway, the fragmentation at the Council level, which ultimately results in a lack of decisiveness, and the lack of institutional clarity de facto weaken the Union’s ambitions. To survive in an era of ‘’weaponisation of everything‘’, a blurred framework between intergovernmental foreign policy and supranational economic policy is not sufficient anymore, and different propositions are considered, from the merging of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission, to the creation of a novel European Security Council. The reality, however, still shows that the EU has a cumbersome institutional setting suited to times of peace, or at least relative stability.
Current reality between the unanimity trap and institutional complexity
The foundational flaw of the EU’s current foreign policy apparatus is that it was built for a rules-based international order that is rapidly declining. While in the past economic governance may have been exploited geopolitically to enforce normative power, today economic dependencies, such as access to critical raw materials, semiconductors, and digital services, have become matters of hard security. The weaponisation of these supply chains calls for rapid and effective adjustments beyond a concrete push towards independence. All these needs clash with the harsh reality that the complex interinstitutional framework hinders foreign policy and overall governance. The war in Ukraine and the subsequent aid packages issued by the EU in support of the invaded state represent a perfect example of the struggles. The unanimity voting, which then requires every Member State to vote in favour of the proposed measure, has been put under strain on multiple occasions in terms of foreign policy, especially in the case of aid packages to Ukraine. The most glaring case occurred at the verge of the end of Orban’s presidency, when Hungary’s veto power was used to block the issuance of a €90 billion loan for two months, thereby delaying provisions for the Ukrainian contingent and population. This case demonstrates that the EU’s unanimity requirement is its Achilles’ heel. It means decision-making is entirely dictated by the slowest or most resistant member state, resulting in responses that are frequently delayed, watered down, or completely paralysed.
Additionally, the existence of the EEAS further complicates the institutional landscape. The High Representative’s (HR/VP) role in interinstitutional coordination results in an overextended, unclear mandate, yet it lacks the ultimate authority to secure consensus. In addition, the more relevant instruments the EU currently has to exert influence, such as trade tariffs, sanctions, and international development funds, are in the hands of the European Commission, thereby further undermining the role of the EEAS. This creates a damaging turf war in which DGs and the EEAS fail to share information out of fear of losing policy ownership, as the Clingendael Institute also stated in its timely report on the EU’s institutional status and geopolitical development. The result is a fragmented external message. When engaging with strategic regions like the Sahel, divergent approaches between the Commission, the EEAS, the European Parliament, and individual Member States severely damage the EU’s credibility.
A reformed EU
In the Brussels Bubble, these criticalities are well known, and proposals to address them are topics of the day. A fascinating proposition, as reported by the Carnegie Europe think tank, is the merging of the Commission and the EEAS. It would partially address the aforementioned problems of institutional clarity and create a single chain of command for EU external action. By doing so, responsibilities are better allocated, effectiveness is enhanced, and a more unified actor in foreign policy emerges. The reform, however, is not sufficient on its own; alongside it, crucial reforms to decision-making must be undertaken. If, currently, foreign policy decisions require unanimity, and if, overall, the Member States have a more relevant role at the EU Council level. The underlying idea is to extend Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to Foreign Policy, thereby strengthening the European Commission’s role at the expense of the Member States. Majority voting would ultimately increase efficiency, but it may be the most problematic reform, given the growing reticence of the Member States towards these supranational impulses. While merging the Commission and the EEAS could resolve the EU’s diplomatic and economic paralysis, the realm of hard military power requires a different approach. Because defence is deeply tied to national sovereignty, a supranational Commission cannot manage it alone. Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, proposes creating the European Security Council to accompany the novel institutional design. It would be understood as the institutionalisation of what is now defined as the E5, a body of political coordination composed of the largest EU (and non-EU) countries that may provide political leadership in defence, granting independence from US coverage. In his report, Kubilius warns that financial investment alone cannot address a profound institutional readiness deficit. Despite spending over three trillion euros on defence in the last decade, Europe still relies on 27 distinct, highly fragmented national militaries, described by the former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, as ‘’bonsai armies’’. This proposed Council would serve as a political authority capable of overcoming national fragmentation. By formalising the core of the E5 within the EU framework (with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland, the countries with the major military and industrial capacity), the unanimity trap may be bypassed, avoiding therefore gridlocks caused by single Member States, therefore hindering unity. Interestingly, Kubilius does not treat this strategy exclusively as an internal EU mechanism, but also understands it as a complementary architecture within the broader European Pillar of NATO. While, in political terms, both provisions aim to harmonise practices across Member States, in economic terms, the framework would foster the creation of a true Single Market for military procurements. In essence, the measures would empower the Union both at the economic and diplomatic levels through the proposed empowered Commission and at the executive decision-making level through the creation of the European Security Council. Ultimately, the institutionalisation of this comprehensive framework may be understood within the broader strategy of variable geometries proposed to reform EU foreign affairs. Among the 27 Member States, with different strategic cultures, insisting on absolute uniformity has become a recipe for paralysis, rather than different political tendencies. In this context, the framework would be an impetus for willing countries with high capacities to further integrate, without forcing militarily non-aligned states to violate their domestic constitutional constraints, and, crucially, without allowing those same states to veto the geopolitical progress of the whole. Historically, European Integration has considered this option on several occasions, leading to the extension of the new institutional settings to the most reticent Member States and to the expansion of integration into related sectors.
Conclusion
The European Union is currently living through a crucial period in which innovation in its outdated institutional architecture is an absolute necessity. To gain relevance, the transition from an economic giant to a capable geopolitical actor must be swift and effective. However, it requires more than increased defence spending; it requires radical structural reforms to keep pace with the hyper-fast pace of modern crises. Merging the European Commission with the EEAS, together with the establishment of a European Security Council, offers a pragmatic framework that may combine institutional dynamism and military efficiency. This political stance is supported at the popular level; 2024 Eurobarometer data show that 71% of Europeans agree that the EU needs to strengthen its capacity to produce military equipment. Additionally, 69% of them support a common foreign policy among the Member States, and 77% support a common defence and security policy. With the public mandate clear and the geopolitical clock ticking, Europe must finally align its political machinery with the will of its people, ensuring the economic giant fully awakens as a formidable global power.
Header Source: Rafael Garcin https://unsplash.com/it/foto/bandiera-dellunione-europea-che-sventola-tra-alberi-verdi-O8Jl6zeq1VA
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