Elidad Addo
In the intricate mosaic of geopolitics, the Sahel region has emerged as a focal point of shifting alliances and strategic recalibrations. Once under the sway of former colonial powers, particularly France, recent years have witnessed a tectonic transformation. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, erstwhile stalwarts of the G5 Sahel alliance, have not only severed ties with the group but have turned towards an unexpected ally – Russia. This geopolitical pivot has not only strained long-standing relationships but has also opened a new chapter in the West-East rivalry in Africa.
This article delves into the historical underpinnings, examining France’s rise and subsequent challenges in the Sahel. It scrutinizes Russia’s increasing involvement, not only militarily but also economically, in the region. As Sahelian nations recalibrate their diplomatic course, this piece explores the nuanced reactions from France and the potential geopolitical implications for Africa. Amid this complex interplay, the article underscores the critical role of the African Union in shaping the continent’s destiny and advocates for a proactive approach to address the region’s challenges, emphasizing that lasting solutions lie in African hands.
Background
For centuries, Africa was divided and exploited by European powers, especially Britain and France. Even after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s, these former colonial masters did not let go of their ties with the newly independent African states. Britain maintained its influence through the Commonwealth of Nations, a voluntary association of former colonies that shared values and interests. France, on the other hand, forged bilateral agreements with its former colonies that bound them in various aspects of military, economic, political and monetary affairs.
France’s influence in sub-Saharan Africa did not end with decolonization. As terrorism and jihadism spread in the Sahel region, France strengthened its ties with five countries in the area: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. These countries formed the G5 alliance in February 2014, seeking Paris’ support in fighting against the violent extremists in the Sahel. This was an additional layer of alliance between France and the sub-Saharan countries aside from the bilateral agreement with individual states in the Sahel.
However, the G5 alliance crumbled as three of its members – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – defected from the group in the last two years. Since then, these countries have soured their relations with France and sought a new ally in Russia. This dramatic change in diplomacy was triggered by a series of coups and anti-France demonstrations in the Sahel region.
France has long been a dominant power in Africa, but its influence now being challenged by Russia’s presence in some of her former colonies, brings an interesting conversation about West-East rivalry in Africa. In this article, I will explore how and why three African countries have turned away from France and towards Russia in the last two years. I will also examine what Russia’s role in the Sahel is, how France is responding to it, and what this means for the future of Africa and the world. In this article, I use the term “Sahel” specifically to refer to Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and it excludes any other countries within the broader region.
France’s Rise and Fall in the Sahel
The Sahel is a vast region in Africa that faces many security challenges. One of the main causes of instability is the presence of jihadist groups, who have exploited the chaos caused by the Libyan civil war and the grievances of local populations. To counter this threat, five countries in the Sahel – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – formed a military alliance called the G5 Sahel. With the support of France, they launched Operation Barkhane in 2014, a large-scale counterterrorism and counter-insurgency campaign. However, the operation faced many difficulties and did not achieve its goals. In 2022, France announced the end of Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of most of its troops from the region.
Despite the presence of French troops in the Sahel for a decade, the insurgency persists and shows no signs of abating. This has led some governments, such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, to seek a ceasefire and a dialogue with the insurgents which France viewed as negotiating with terrorists. The reason for this is the distrust in France’s capability to quash the insurgency, along with the surge of anti-French sentiments based on conspiracy theories that France is collaborating with the jihadists to exploit the mineral wealth of the Sahel. These theories are further supported by the fact that the jihadists are expanding their influence despite the French intervention, the French corporations are profiting from the mineral resources, and the living conditions of the Sahelians are worsening. Recent coups d’état in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have brought in anti-France regimes, increasing the French unpopularity in these countries.
In essence, the shift in cooperation from France to Russia by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso stems from France’s perceived failure in ensuring a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region. These countries consider their partnership with Russia as a more robust and determined alliance that better serves their goals of maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
Russia’s Engagement in the Sahel
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso share longstanding diplomatic ties with Russia, dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, Burkina Faso and Mali initiated diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union during the 1960s, while Niger established its diplomatic connection in the 1970s. This enduring relationship underscores Russia’s historical influence in sub-Saharan Africa.
The roots of Russia’s presence in the region can be traced to the post-independence era in Africa, characterized by a wave of political autonomy for newly independent states. During this period, leaders in many African nations leaned towards Eastern ideologies, particularly in the form of African socialism. As a result, Russia found common ground with these nations, contributing to the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic ties with countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
In recent years, the topic of Russia’s influence has garnered public attention, primarily driven by a notable enhancement in diplomatic relations between Sahelian governments and the Kremlin. This shift is particularly evident in the realm of military cooperation, where Russia and the Sahelian nations have strengthened ties. This collaboration, to the detriment of France’s G5 alliance, is indicative of a strategic reorientation.
The focal point of this evolving relationship lies in the increased reliance on the Wagner Group, a private military company, in the Sahel region to support the local governments. Notably, the gradual substitution of the Wagner Group with the Russia African Corps underscores Russia’s steadfast commitment to offering an alternative to French forces in addressing the escalating jihadist threat in the Sahel region.
Additionally, it is important to highlight that Russia’s engagement with the nations comprising the Alliance of Sahel States extends beyond military support, encompassing significant economic collaboration. The removal of French military presence from the Sahel region also affected certain French multinational mining companies operating in that area.
In the aftermath of this shift, Russian companies have capitalized on opportunities, securing various agreements facilitated by their government to invest in the Sahel region. This dual approach, involving both military assistance and economic cooperation, underscores Russia’s multifaceted involvement in the Sahel and suggests a broader strategic interest in the region beyond the realm of security.
One notable initiative involves the agreement to construct what is anticipated to be the largest gold refinery in West Africa, situated in Mali. Concurrently, Russia is actively involved in exploring potential minerals for nuclear energy and harnessing solar energy in the desert regions. This dual approach highlights Russia’s strategic interest in both traditional and renewable energy resources, positioning the country as a key player in shaping the energy landscape of the Sahel.
In Niger, where the fate of uranium mining supporting France and the EU remains uncertain, Russia’s presence introduces a new dynamic. While no clear decision has been reached regarding uranium mining, the mere existence of Russian involvement poses a potential challenge to the Western monopoly on Nigerien uranium. Burkina Faso has also taken steps to strengthen ties with Russia, exemplified by granting a permit to Nordgold, a Russian mining company. This move is part of a broader strategy to enhance the economic relationship between Burkina Faso and Russia. It is particularly noteworthy as both nations reopened their embassies, which had been closed since the 1990s, indicating a proactive effort to foster economic cooperation and mutual development.
The discernible trend of increasing Russian involvement in crucial developmental sectors within the Sahel region indicates that the ongoing military cooperation between Russia and these states serves as a foundational step toward establishing a more comprehensive and interconnected relationship. The current military collaboration appears to function as a launchpad, paving the way for deeper engagements and partnerships between Russia and the Sahelian nations across various strategic developmental domains.
France’s Reaction to the Sahel Situation
France’s reaction to the evolving diplomatic landscape in the Sahel has been notably measured following the ultimatum instructing its military to exit the territory. Rather than responding reactively to the hostilities faced since 2020, France appears to be adopting a rational approach in its dealings with Sahelian governments. A particularly significant move, in my opinion, has been France’s decision to suspend all diplomatic activities in Niger, culminating in the closure of its embassy in Niamey in January of this year.
In the early part of last year, the military junta in Burkina Faso expelled the French ambassador, and this was later followed by the directive for the French embassy’s defense attaché to leave in September of the same year. Despite these escalating tensions and deteriorating relations, France has not yet decided on the status of its embassy in Ouagadougou, underscoring a measured and deliberate approach in responding to the situation in Burkina Faso.
The scenario in Mali parallels that of Burkina Faso, where the French embassy in Bamako continues to operate despite a suspension in the issuance of visas to Malians intending to travel to France. This reflects a similar cautious and strategic stance adopted by France in the face of challenges in the Sahel region, emphasizing a reluctance to hastily sever diplomatic ties despite strained relations.
France has issued a general response to the Sahelian nations, signaling the cessation of visa issuance and cultural exchange funding for students from the region. Additionally, France has imposed a ban on partnerships with artists from the Sahel. Notably, the French Culture Minister clarified that the prohibition on artistic collaborations is not intended to sever cultural ties with the Sahelian nations. This nuanced approach suggests that while certain measures are being taken, the broader goal is not a complete disconnection but rather a strategic reevaluation of specific aspects of cultural engagement between France and the Sahel region.
France’s approach in dealing with Sahelian governments reflects a mature and calculated stance. Given the historically mutually beneficial relationship between France and the Sahelian states, this position seems unsurprising. Recognizing that France has traditionally garnered a significant share of the benefits, it appears prudent for the country not to hastily sever ties, especially when the region is facing challenges from external adversaries. The strategic importance of maintaining connections in a territory that could potentially be exploited to France’s disadvantage suggests a careful consideration of long-term geopolitical consequences.
Geopolitical Implication
In considering the geopolitical consequences of the evolving situation, an African proverb comes to mind, emphasizing the potential repercussions. The proverb aptly states, “when two elephants fight, it is the grass underneath that suffers,” illustrating the notion that conflicts between powerful entities invariably harm the vulnerable. This sentiment echoes the West-East rivalry witnessed during the Cold War, reminiscent of the current replacement of French influence with Russian involvement in the Sahel.
Drawing parallels with the conflict in Syria, where the involvement of both Russia and Western powers prolonged the crisis and resulted in the exploitation of the country, loss of lives, and destabilization, a similar fate could be foreseen for the Sahelian region. The shifting diplomatic dynamics in the Sahel may turn the region into a battleground for European rivalries. If history is any indicator, the potential consequences include a protracted conflict, exploitation of Sahelian resources, loss of lives, and destabilization, potentially leading to the displacement of the local population.
The withdrawal of Sahelian states from the West African regional bloc, ECOWAS, earlier this year contributes to an emerging intra-state rivalry within Africa. This decision was prompted by their dissatisfaction with ECOWAS’ handling of the coup d’état in the region. Adding to the complexity, Russia’s strategy of building a mercenary group, Wagner, under a different guise, raises concerns about the peace situation on the continent. Wagner’s track record, particularly in assisting a coup d’état in Niger, amplifies these apprehensions. The potential presence of Russian-backed mercenaries in the region raises the specter of infiltration into other pro-Western countries, potentially instigating coups to solidify Russia’s influence in Africa. This situation could lead Sub-Saharan Africa into a reminiscent wave of military takeovers, akin to the challenges faced in the 1960s after the wave of political independence. The unfolding events pose a serious threat to regional stability and the democratic trajectory that has been pursued in the post-independence era.
The expanding influence of the Russian government in Africa represents a significant strategic challenge to Western powers, which have been contending with China as a major developmental partner for several African states in recent years. While China remains a dominant player, Russia’s strengthened presence poses an additional hurdle for Western influence on the continent. Notably, the impact of Russia’s presence in Africa may not heavily affect China, as both nations share similar political and economic ideologies and harbor a common rival.
Conclusion
While it may be tempting to attribute the challenges faced by African states solely to foreign influence, a more nuanced perspective acknowledges that, to some extent, external players such as Europe, Russia, the US, or China do contribute to problems in Africa. However, the primary entity accountable for addressing these issues is the African Union, which serves as the overarching organization for African states. The longstanding passive stance of the African Union, particularly its inability to offer effective leadership in addressing terrorism and stability challenges in the region, lays the groundwork for self-interested foreign involvement. Such external interventions often manage problems temporarily but fail to provide lasting solutions.
It is imperative for Africa to awaken to this reality and demand proactive and effective action from the African Union. The continent must take ownership of its challenges and push for the vision of Africa it desires. Only through a robust and committed African Union can the continent truly understand and address its problems, paving the way for sustainable solutions that serve the best interests of African nations.
The Euroculturer 